



MOVING COSTS, SECURITY OF TENURE AND EVICTION 
 








We contrast equilibrium and welfare analysis in the rental housing market under two 
property rights regimes – eviction rights and security of tenure – when tenants face 
moving costs. A tenant’s idiosyncratic benefit from his unit and a landlord’s idiosyncratic 
profit from conversion are treated as private information. The two regimes differ when a 
tenant wants to stay in his unit but the landlord wants to redevelop it. North American 
housing markets have been characterized by eviction rights and many European housing 
markets by security of tenure. Under eviction rights, a landlord who evicts a tenant 
imposes a negative externality on him, which can be imperfectly internalized through a 
demolition (conversion) tax. Similarly, under security of tenure efficiency can be 
improved by subsidizing the moving costs of tenants.  
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1.    Introduction 
 
         A sitting tenant wishes to stay in her apartment.  The landlord wishes to redevelop 
it.  How is the conflict resolved?  How should it be resolved? There are three general 
approaches to answering such questions. The first is to apply the Coase Theorem [Coase 
(1960), Farrell (1987), de Meza (1988), Anderlini and Felli (2001)] which states that, in 
the absence of bargaining or contracting costs and with perfect information, the conflict 
will be resolved efficiently if the government does no more than allocate property rights.  
The allocation of property rights affects the division of surplus between the two parties, 
but not the Pareto efficiency of the negotiated outcome.  This is a strong result obtained 
by employing strong assumptions. 
  The second approach is to model the negotiation process between the two parties, 
treating explicitly the bargaining/contracting costs and the asymmetries of information.  
Unfortunately, the properties of negotiation games are sensitive to the specification of the 
game [Osborne and Rubinstein (1990)] and reasonable people will differ on the 
appropriate specification of the landlord-tenant negotiation game. 
  The third approach, which this paper adopts, is to examine an extreme case of 
contractual incompleteness [e.g. Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart (1990), Hart and Moore  
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(1990)] in which bargaining/contracting costs are so high and/or informational 
asymmetries are so severe that there is no scope for negotiation.
2  Resolution of the 
conflict is completely determined by the property rights spelled out in landlord-tenant 
law.  We consider two extreme property rights regimes: either all landlords have 
unqualified eviction rights or all tenants have unqualified security of tenure. 
  Three casual types of evidence suggest that our assumption of no negotiation 
between landlord and tenant provides a good approximation to reality.  The first concerns 
common experience with rental housing markets in North America.  A tenant dealing 
with a large landlord is almost invariably offered a take-it-or-leave-it lease providing 
only the minimum tenant rights consistent with the jurisdiction’s landlord-tenant law.  
While small landlords may show more flexibility in lease terms than large ones, there is 
still considerably less contractual diversity than would be observed if the conditions of 
the Coase Theorem applied.
3 
  The second type of casual evidence is the contrast in operation between North 
American and North European rental housing markets, and how well this contrast can be 
related to differences in landlord-tenant law. North American rental housing markets 
come close to one extreme in which under law landlords have unqualified eviction rights; 
giving due notice, the landlord may simply choose not to renew a tenant’s lease.  
                                                 
2 The basic idea is that, in the presence of asymmetric information, if all landlords are offering contracts of 
type x and one landlord deviates by offering contract y, then either the deviating landlord is exceptional in 
a way that is harmful to tenants (e.g. if contract x is security of tenure and contract y is eviction rights, the 
landlord offering contract y likely has an exceptional propensity to evict) or the tenant who finds the 
deviating contract attractive is exceptional in a way that is harmful to the landlord (e.g. if contract x is 
eviction rights and contract y is security of tenure, tenants who find contract y particularly attractive are 
those who plan to stay in their units for an exceptionally long period of time.) 
3 For example, at least for the jurisdictions with which we are familiar (Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New 
York, Illinois, and Ontario) residential leases longer than one year are very uncommon.  Lease 
renegotiation in the middle of a lease is also uncommon.   4 
European rental housing markets come close to the other extreme in which, under law, 
tenants have complete security of tenure; as long as a tenant pays her rent and is not a 
nuisance to neighbors, she may stay in her apartment indefinitely.  If landlord-tenant law 
determines the form of lease, one would expect to observe greater tenant turnover and 
more redevelopment in North America.  Furthermore, in Northern Europe one would 
expect to observe many highly profitable but unexploited redevelopment opportunities,   
and indeed, this is what is observed.  
  The third type of casual evidence is the importance tenants attach to legislation or 
regulatory changes that improve security of tenure [Miron and Cullingworth (1988) and 
Miron (1990)].  It could be that tenant groups are misguided in their vociferous appeals 
for greater legal security of tenure, or recognize that it improves their bargaining power.  
Our interpretation, however, is that tenant groups understand that high bargaining costs 
severely curtail the individual tenant’s freedom to contract, and consequently that the 
most effective way for them to achieve improved security of tenure is through legislation. 
  To examine these issues, we employ a stationary-state model of the housing market 
with durable housing and household moving costs. Moving costs are central to the 
concern of this paper since without them there would essentially be no conflict between 
landlord and tenant, and full eviction rights would be efficient. Previous literature has 
developed theoretical models of household mobility with moving costs as a basis for 
empirical work on housing demand; almost all of this has focused on owner-occupied 
housing [Amundsen (1985), Clark and Onaka (1983), Dynarski (1985), Edin and 
Englund (1991), Goodman (1989, 1995), Hanushek and Quigley (1978), Quigley and 
Weinberg (1977), Venti and Wise (1984), Weinberg, Friedman and Mayo (1981),   5 
Henderson and Ioannides (1989)]. This paper, in contrast, examines the effect on rental 
housing market equilibrium of the property rights regime in the presence of moving 
costs.
4   
   Section 2 provides a description of the model’s assumptions and structure, and 
section 3 a technical description of the microeconomic behavior. Sections 4 and 5 
examine the equilibrium conditions of the two regulatory regimes and summarize the 
comparative static analysis. Section 6 reports on the welfare analysis of the two regimes. 
Numerical examples are presented in section 7 and extensions pointed out in section 8. 
2.   Assumptions 
       We treat a stationary housing market with some vacant land and two types of durable 
housing (or two submarkets i=1,2). All houses of a given type are identical. To simplify 
the model, we assume symmetry between the two types of housing. For example, the two 
housing types might differ only in floor plans or in location, but be identical in all other 
respects. Time is treated as an infinite sequence of discrete periods. The timeline in 
Figure 1 shows how the tenant and landlord decisions (to be discussed below) are 
sequenced within a representative time period.  Note that outcomes occurring at the end 
of the period are discounted to the beginning of the period, while outcomes occurring in 
the beginning of the period are not. 
         There is a given number of infinitely lived tenants, N. Each tenant rents one 
housing unit in each time period, and makes a moving decision each period. A tenant 
moves when she wants to change location or floor plan. Tenants are identical in income 
and in tastes except for idiosyncratic taste components that measure the strength of their 
                                                 
4 Pitchford and Snyder (2003) examine how property rights affect decisions under land use externalities.   6 
preference for type of housing. For each tenant and in each time period, the realized 
values of these two idiosyncratic utilities are independent draws from a Gumbel 
distribution with a dispersion (inverse standard deviation) parameter µ. (see Appendix 
1)
5.  Each tenant is risk neutral and looks ahead to the end of the current period when she 
expects to receive a discounted expected lifetime utility for the future.  Tenants begin the 
time period committed to stay in their current dwelling for the period. After the period 
begins, a tenant realizes new idiosyncratic utilities for the two housing types that apply 
for the next period and, on the basis of this information and the cost of moving, makes a 
moving decision which is acted upon at the end of the period.   
        The time-invariant housing technology is described by maintenance, demolition and 
construction costs. A housing unit is constructed on a unit area of land. At the end of 
each period, if the housing unit is not demolished, a fixed maintenance cost must be 
incurred, in which case the unit provides the same level of housing service in the next 
period. If it is demolished, the land on which it was constructed must remain vacant for 
one period before subsequent construction is possible. Conversion from one type of 
housing unit to another can happen only by demolishing one unit in this period and 
building the other unit in the next. Costs consist of additive systematic and idiosyncratic 
components. The idiosyncratic costs of maintenance and demolition in submarket i are 
i.i.d. Gumbel across landlords with mean zero and dispersion parameter   for a unit of 
type i=1,2. The idiosyncratic costs of construction and land maintenance are also i.i.d.  
Φi
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derivations in this paper.  The advantage of assuming a Gumbel distribution is that it leads to logit choice 
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Gumbel across landowners with mean zero and dispersion parameter .  Each period, a 
landlord who owns an existing housing unit makes an independent draw of the 
idiosyncratic maintenance and demolition cost from the Gumbel distribution for his 
submarket. Similarly, a landowner who owns a unit vacant land parcel makes three 
independent draws from the Gumbel distribution for the land market: the idiosyncratic 
maintenance cost for land and the idiosyncratic construction cost of each type of housing 
unit.  
φ
          Asset prices are determined at the beginning of each period, before the realization 
of the idiosyncratic component of costs, under the assumption that investors (i.e. the 
landlords and landowners) are risk neutral and have perfect foresight about asset prices at 
the end of the period and rational expectations about as yet unrealized idiosyncratic costs 
for the end of the period. The process of idiosyncratic cost realization and asset price 
determination repeats recursively every period (see Figure 1). 
         Before the end of the period, if subject to eviction, each tenant first learns whether 
the landlord will evict or not, which depends on the realization of her landlord’s 
maintenance and demolition costs. At the end of the period, all evicted tenants choose a 
submarket (housing type) in which to rent for the next period, while all tenants who are 
not evicted either stay in their dwelling for the next period or voluntarily move to the 
other submarket. The process repeats in the next period and each tenant anticipates that 
the process will recur forever. Landlords with voluntarily vacated units decide to either 
demolish or maintain them, while owners of vacant land either keep the land vacant or 
construct one of the two types of housing units on the land. Since eviction occurs only   8 
when demolition is profitable, landlords who have evicted their tenants demolish their 
units. 
3. The Model 
        We begin by specifying the expected lifetime utility of a tenant in the current period 
t, discounted to the beginning of the period and contingent on moving or staying for the 
next period. Let i index this period’s submarket and also next period’s if the tenant does 
not change submarkets and i′  denote next period’s submarket if the tenant changes 
submarket at the end of period t. Y is the tenant’s earned income and remains exogenous 
(income from the housing market will be endogenous)
6,  or  is the rent, α >0 is the 
marginal utility of income, U or   the lifetime expected utilities from period t+1 on, 
conditional on being in housing of type i (or i′) and on information available at the 
beginning of this period t.  is the one-period discount factor for utility or for costs,  is 
the monetary cost of moving from submarket  i to submarket i′, and  and  are the 
idiosyncratic utilities associated with submarkets i and i′  respectively. If the tenant (a 
“stayer”) occupies housing of type i in the current and the next period and does not move, 
her expected lifetime utility at the start of the current period is   I f  
the tenant moves from housing type i in this period to housing of type i′ at the end of the  
period, expected lifetime utility at the start of this period is   
Note that when i′ = i, the move is from one housing unit to another in the same submarket 
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6 Although our model does not have income effects, we still carry income Y in our notation, to indicate that 
 is the income left over after paying rent that can be used to buy non-housing goods.   i YR −  9 
continues to prefer the same submarket). As already noted, for each time period and each 
tenant,   and  are i.i.d. Gumbel with dispersion parameter µ (see Appendix 1).  u1 u2
     Now impose the symmetry assumption, and  =m. The resulting 
stationary equilibrium has the property that  andUU . In this 
situation, a tenant who is evicted and a tenant who is considering moving voluntarily, 
each face a binary choice between the two submarkets. In the non-symmetric case, a 
tenant evicted from a unit in submarket i moves to another unit in i if, for the realized 
values of   and u , α(Y−R
mmmm 12 21 11 22 ===
12 RRR == 12 =
i i i m R Y ′ + − − δ α ) (
U =
i U δ u1 2 i −δmii) + δUi + δui >   holds for 
, or  moves to a unit in i  if the opposite inequality holds. However, because of 
symmetry, the above inequality reduces to just a comparison of the idiosyncratic utilities: 
stay in submarket i if δ or move to i  if the opposite holds. Therefore, under 
symmetry, the expected maximized idiosyncratic utility from moving, net of the disutility 
of moving, for an evicted tenant is (see Appendix 1):  
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       Voluntarily moving within the same submarket is irrational since all units in the 
same submarket are identical in all respects, and moving cost would be incurred 
needlessly. Hence, a voluntary mover either stays in his unit or moves to the other 
submarket. He moves from  to i  (i ≠ i) if    i ′ ′ ( ) ii i i YR m U u αδ δ ′′ ′ −− + +
() ii YR U u αδ >− ++ or stays in i if the opposite inequality holds. Under symmetry, the 
inequality reduces to   Then, applying the calculus of Appendix 1, the 
probability that a tenant voluntarily moves is P(m) (with 1− P(m), the probability of 
staying) and is binary logit: 
. i mu u αδ δ δ ′ −+ >  10 













The expected maximized idiosyncratic utility from moving net of moving cost for such a 
voluntary mover is (see Appendix 1): 
(3)                             (δ/µ) ln [1+e [max( , ; )] ii Eu u m i i δδ α δ ′ ′ −≠ =
−αµm] ≡ k(m).   
Obviously, km  For a forward-looking tenant who moves voluntarily, U must 
satisfy the following condition under symmetry, at the beginning of any time period: 
ˆ () () . km >
(4)                                                 U=α (Y− R) + k(m) + δU. 
 The first term on the right is the utility derived from the current housing unit during the 
period, Y being the quantity of the numeraire non-housing good. The second term is 
the expected maximized utility of moving net of moving cost, prior to the realization of 
the idiosyncratic utilities (and, hence, prior to knowing the outcome of the moving 
decision) and the third term is the expected lifetime utility from the end of the period on,  
discounted to the start of the period. For a tenant who is subject to eviction, U satisfies: 
R −
(5)                                     U U m k Q m k Q R Y D D δ α + + − + − = )] ( ˆ ) ( ) 1 [( ) ( 
Corresponding to the second term in (4), the bracketed term in (5) measures the expected 
net utility of moving for a tenant who is subject to eviction.   (to be derived below) is 
the probability that the landlord will want to demolish the unit and, hence, will evict the 
tenant. Therefore, the expected net utility from moving, as perceived at the beginning of 
the period, prior to the realization of the idiosyncratic utilities and prior to the realization 
of the eviction decision, equals the probability that the tenant will not be evicted times 
the expected maximized net idiosyncratic utility from the voluntary moving decision, 
D Q  11 
plus the probability that the tenant will be evicted times the expected value of the 
maximized net idiosyncratic utility from being forced to move due to eviction.  
        Consider now the stationary discounted profits of a landowner in the current period. 
Let r be the exogenous land rent, v and V  the stationary prices of land and of each type 
of housing, and , ,  the recurring systematic (or mean) fixed costs of construction, 
demolition and maintenance respectively. The idiosyncratic costs have zero means and 
are measured as deviations from these systematic costs. Where i= 1,2 (construction), the 
discounted profit at the beginning of the period is π
i
i +
i B i D i M
i = − v + r + δ (Vi − Bi − bi) . Where 
i=0, the land is kept vacant and the profit is   The terms b  and   
are the idiosyncratic costs of construction and   is the idiosyncratic cost of maintaining 
the land vacant. The profit for a landlord who owns a housing unit of type i (with a tenant 
who is either evicted or moved out voluntarily) is    if the 
unit is not demolished and   if the unit is demolished, where 
n
). ( 0 0 b v r v − + + − = δ π
0 b
ˆ i i i R V + + − = δ π




) ( i i M V − −
ii VR π =− + %
i and di are the idiosyncratic costs of maintenance and demolition respectively.  
       We assume that the asset markets for housing and land are competitive and that 






. Hence, the expected economic profit from land in the beginning of the 
period, prior to the realization of the idiosyncratic costs, is:  .    () 012 max , , 0 E πππ =  
       When landlords have full eviction rights, the profit from an existing housing unit of 
type i= 1,2 is:  .  Recalling that all idiosyncratic costs are i.i.d. 
Gumbel distributed and serially uncorrelated, we impose symmetry and apply the 
() ˆ max , 0 ii E ππ =   %    12 
properties summarized in Appendix 1 to derive the asset prices by solving the appropriate 
zero-profit equation for v or Vi (of which, the one solved for Vi, equation (7) below, holds 
in the case of full eviction rights).  
(6)                   v ,  where  r V v g + = ) , ( 0 []
) (
0 2 ln ) , (
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The left side of each equation is the asset price that must be bid at the beginning of the 
period, so that, given the rent received for the period, the uncertainty at the beginning of 
the period about idiosyncratic costs, and the known end-of-period asset prices for 
housing and land, expected economic profits at the beginning of the period are zero. The 
terms   and   measure the part of the asset price which is due to 
discounted future rents net of conversion costs, and r or R are the rental return during the 
period.  
) , ( 0 V v g ) , ( 1 V v g
        When tenants have full security of tenure, landlords cannot evict them. The expected 
profit of such a landlord in submarket i when the tenant does not move out is given by   
E[ δ(Vi−Mi−ni)−Vi ] = δ (Vi − Mi) − Vi , since E[ni]=0. But if the tenant does move out 
voluntarily, the landlord becomes unconstrained and his expected profit is determined in 
the same way as the profit of a landlord with full eviction rights.  
       What remains is to derive the probabilities, prior to the revelation of the idiosyncratic 
costs, that construction and demolition are profitable. The probability that, at any time 
period, the demolition of an existing house is profitable is  Prob[  for each 
i=1,2. The probability that construction of a housing unit of type i on a vacant unit land 
= iD Q ] ˆ ii ππ > %  13 
parcel is profitable is Q Prob . As Appendix 1 explains, these 
are binomial logits (for demolition) and trinomial logits (for construction) respectively. 
Applying symmetry: 
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     We will now formulate the symmetric and stationary market equilibrium conditions 
for each of the two regimes. First, we will consider the regime in which all landlords 
have full eviction rights (or, equivalently, tenants have no security of tenure). We will 
then move to the second regime in which all tenants have full security of tenure (or, 
equivalently, landlords have no eviction rights.) 
      In each case, the equilibrium conditions must be solved for four variables: the rent of 
housing, R, the asset price of land, v, the asset price of  housing, V,  and the discounted 
utility, U.  The parameters governing the equilibria are: population, N (which is also 
equal to housing units), the marginal utility of income, α, moving cost, m, the discount 
factor, δ, the systematic conversion costs, B, D and M, the amount of vacant plus built-up 
land, L ( > N ), the land rent, r, the dispersion parameters for idiosyncratic utilities, µ, 
and the dispersion parameters of the idiosyncratic costs of converting  housing, Φ, and 
converting vacant land, φ. 
      As already noted, N is the number of tenants and also the number of housing units 
under the assumption that each tenant occupies one housing unit. Hence, with the number 
of tenants exogenous, the aggregate demand for housing is inelastic and with the housing   14 
market clearing, the number of housing units is also N and remains the same under each 
regime. Because of the symmetry, the number of tenants moving from i to   and those 
moving from   to   are equal. We close the model by assuming that the investment 
return from aggregate asset values is distributed equally among the N tenants at the end 
of each period. This rent dividend, discounted to the beginning of the period is 
i′
i′ i
Ω(, ) ( )
()
vV
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 4. Eviction rights 
      In this regime, we must solve: 
(10a)                              ,  0 ) , ( ) ( ) , ( = − − V v Q N L V v NQ B D
(10b)                                         ,   vg v V r −− 0 0 (, ) =
= (10c)                                        Vg ,   v V R −− 1 0 (, )
(10d)       UY .  [] [ ] {} ˆ (, ) 1 (, ) ( ) (, )( ) 0 DD v V R Q v V k m Q v V k mU αδ −+ Ω − − − + − =
(10a) expresses the requirement that the stocks of vacant land and housing must be 
unchanging over time, by the flow quantity of housing demolished in each period, NQD, 
equaling the flow quantity that is built,  . (10b) and (10c) are the asset price (or 
normal return) equations for vacant land and for housing respectively. (10d) expresses  
B Q N L ) ( −
the fact that the expected lifetime utility is stable over time, and includes asset income. 
      Let us examine the properties of (10a)-(10d).  First, note that (10a) and (10b) together 
provide two equations in two unknowns, V and v. Once these are solved for, R can be 
found directly from (10c) and then, using the V, v and R just found, one can get U from 
(10d). Writing (10b) as V as a function of v (see (6)):   15 
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Meanwhile, (10a) can be rewritten as: 
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which is a linear equation in ν − V  space with slope one. From these results, shown in 




Next, write (10c) in full: 
(10c′)                           ()
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Φ(ν−D) (, ) D Qv V δ =− . 
       The full comparative static properties are worked out in Appendix 2 and are recorded 
in Table 1.  It will be useful to examine the economics of the changes in V, v and R with 
respect to one of the exogenous variables.  Consider M, the cost of maintenance.  An   16 
increase in M has no effect on the land valuation equation (10b), but causes the 
stationarity equation (10a′) to shift up, which (from Figure 2) causes an increase in both 
housing and land values.  This may seem strange, since intuition might suggest that a rise 
in any conversion cost should lower both housing and land values.  This intuition, 
however, ignores the endogeneity of housing rent.  The explanation is as follows.  
Holding V and v constant, the rise in M causes the demolition probability to increase, and 
hence the number of housing units demolished to exceed the number of housing units 
constructed.  To restore stationarity, V  must rise, since this both decreases the 
demolition probability and increases the construction probability (see (8) and (9)).  To 
continue satisfying the land valuation equation (10b), both V and v must increase (see 
Figure 2); the increase in V  effectively increases the option value of the land.  
Housing rent rises, too, for two related reasons: first, the cost of maintaining housing 
increases, and second, the opportunity cost of the land used in housing increases.  Put 
alternatively, to obtain the normal rate of return, in the face of a higher housing price and 
higher maintenance costs, the landlord must raise housing rents. 
−ν
−ν
        Turning to welfare (given by (10d)), it can be written after substituting out R by 
using equation (10c): 
(10d′)  
[] 1
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m         
 (10d′) gives U as a function of V, v, and exogenous parameters. The effect of an increase 
in an exogenous parameter on welfare can be decomposed into direct and allocative 
effects.  The direct effect occurs holding the allocation (as characterized by   and  ( , ) D QV v  17 
(,) B QV v) fixed.  The allocative effect derives from the induced change in the 









; a unit increase in maintenance costs, holding   fixed, causes per capita 






 times this amount. The allocative effect is the change in discounted per capita 
utility due to the induced change in the equilibrium allocation, and equals   times the 
change in discounted per capita deadweight loss. The allocative effect is also negative.  
The rise in M makes demolition more attractive and hence increases the equilibrium 
demolition rate, which leads to more tenants being evicted and hence an increase in the 
deadweight loss associated with uncompensated eviction.  Thus, a rise in maintenance 
costs is unambiguously harmful.  In contrast, the effect of a rise in demolition costs is 
ambiguous.  The direct effect is negative, the allocative effect is positive because 
demolition and hence uncompensated eviction are discouraged.  The same is true of 
building costs, which discourage eviction (demolition) indirectly by discouraging 
construction.  An increase in the supply of land has the opposite effect, the allocative 
effect encouraging construction.  A rise in land rent has only a positive direct effect, and 
a rise in moving costs only a negative direct effect since these changes do not affect the 
equilibrium allocation. 
α
( ) m Q 0 =
5. Security of tenure 
       In this case, we must solve: 
(11a)                                   ,  ( , ) ( ) ( , ) DB NP v V L N Q v V −−  18 
(11b)                                               ,   vg v V r −− 0 0 (, ) =
− = (11c)                               VP ,  [] {} 1 ()( ,) 1 () ( ) 0 m g v V P m V M R δ −+ − −
(11d)                                       UY .  [] (, ) ( ) 0 v V R k m U αδ −+ Ω − − − =
The roles of the equations are the same as in the previous regime. Note that the equation 
for asset price of land (11b) is identical to (10b) because eviction limitations on landlords 
who own housing units do not directly affect the conversion options of those who own 
vacant land parcels. (11a), like (10a), states that the flow of demolition must be matched 
by the flow of construction, where the stock of housing units available for demolition 
now consists only of those voluntarily vacated by the tenants. Equation (11c) gives the 
asset price for housing. The terms in {•} are values net of conversion cost expected in the 
beginning of the period. These are equal to the probability that the tenant will move out 
voluntarily multiplied by the unrestricted expected net-of-conversion-cost values, 
 that can be realized from demolition or maintenance once the tenant has moved 
out, plus the probability that the tenant will stay in the unit multiplied by the net-of 
maintenance-cost value, δ (V−M), that will accrue from the maintenance of the occupied 
unit, recalling that the idiosyncratic maintenance cost has zero mean: E[n
gv V 1(, ) ,
1]=E[n2]=0.  
Finally, the last equation, expresses the constancy of  lifetime utility and includes asset 
income, given that tenants are free to move voluntarily and recalling that k(m), derived 
earlier, is the expected utility from moving voluntarily, net of the cost of moving. 
  The properties of (11a) are similar to those of (10a), derived earlier. They follow 
by rewriting (11a) as: 
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which is a linear equation in ν − V  space with slope one.  Comparing (11a′) and (10a′) 
shows that replacing eviction rights with security of tenure has the same effect on the 
stationarity condition as an increase in the quantity of vacant land. 
  Since (11b) is the same as (10b), for a given set of parameter values, plotting 
(11a′) and (11b) would yield the same graph as Figure 2, with only one difference – 
(11a′) would be below (10a′) for all v.  Thus, for a given set of exogenous parameter 
values, security of tenure results in lower housing and land values than eviction rights. 
From Figure 2, because the slope of (10b') is greater than one, the premium of housing 
value over land value is lower under security of tenure. Thus, relative to eviction rights, 
security of tenure results in a lower construction rate and a higher (desired) demolition 
rate. However, since only units voluntarily vacated are eligible for demolition, the actual 
number of demolitions is lower relative to eviction rights. The welfare of this regime can 
be written by using (11c) to substitute out R: 
(11d′)                  
[] 1
1
( 1 ) 1 () ( ) ()(,) ()
1
LN
UY V P m V M P m g V k
N
αδ δ ν δ ν
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m . 
        The comparative static properties of the equilibrium with security of tenure are, in 
terms of sign, almost the same as those under eviction rights.  The only major difference 
is that under security of tenure, in contrast to eviction rights, an increase in moving costs 
has allocative effects from (11a′), reducing the demolition and construction rates.  
          An important set of results, included in Table 1 in the θ column and explained in 
Appendix 2, concerns the effects of a switch in regimes, a greater corresponding to 
greater security of tenure. For example, what effect does the switch from eviction rights 
θ  20 
to security of tenure have on housing rent?  There are two opposing effects.  On one 
hand, housing value falls, and consequently its opportunity rent.  On the other hand, 
security of tenure prevents the landlord from fully exploiting his profit opportunities. 
Then, holding asset values constant, housing rent rises to maintain a normal rate of 
return. 
6. Welfare analysis   
         In both equilibria, there are uninternalized externalities. Under eviction rights, 
landlords do not compensate tenants for the moving costs they must incur when evicted. 
And under security of tenure, tenants do not compensate landlords for the profitable 
conversions they must forego, from not being able to evict tenants. These externalities 
remain uninternalized because of bargaining costs which we have assumed to be 
prohibitive. In this section, we investigate the potential efficiency gains from policy 
intervention, on the assumption that individuals’ idiosyncratic utilities and landlords’ 
idiosyncratic costs remain private information. While we restrict our analysis to 
Pigouvian taxation/subsidization, the same allocations could also be achieved with a 
system of tradable permits.        
        In the regime of full eviction rights, when a Pigouvian tax, T, is levied on 
demolitions, (10a)-(10d) are modified by replacing the demolition cost, D, with D+T and 
by distributing the proceeds of the tax  to consumers so that   is replaced by 
. Under security  of tenure, when a mover subsidy equal to S is 
given, the moving cost, m, is replaced by m−S in the market equilibrium equations (11a)-
(11d) and the income dividend from asset values is modified to reflect the cost of the 
subsidy, by replacing   with  . The demolition tax, T, and the 
Ω(, ) vV
T V v Q V v D ) , ( ) , ( δ + Ω
Ω(, ) vV (, ) ( ) vV PmS δ Ω−  21 
moving subsidy, S, are optimized to maximize the lifetime discounted expected utility 
level, U, under the corresponding regime.   
         Under full eviction rights, the optimal demolition tax, T
*, makes demolition less 
profitable, causing the marginal landlord to postpone demolition and thus conferring an 
expected benefit to the tenant in the unit. This benefit is the gain in expected utility  the 
tenant enjoys from moving (or not) voluntarily less the expected utility of moving by 
eviction. The tax must be set so that the disutility of the tax paid by the landlord (or the 
social marginal cost of the tax) just equals the expected marginal benefit to the tenant. 
Hence, discounting the tax to the start of the period: 
(12)                                  .  αδTk m k m
* () $() =−
The Pigouvian prescription to internalize the externality is to tax (subsidize) the landlord 
this amount when he demolishes (maintains) the unit.  The resulting allocations are 
identical.  We considered the tax solution since it would be administratively simpler to 
keep track of evictions than maintained units and since it would be viewed as fairer to 
have landlords pay for the cost they impose on tenants.   
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dχ  , where χ denotes any 
exogenous variable, are the same since the only change is that ′  D  = D+
1
α(k(m)− ˆ  k (m))
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has replaced D. What about the comparative static derivatives forU , the efficient 
welfare level?  Note that after substitution of  , U  becomes:  D′
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Consider 
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. Routine manipulation indicates that the last 
two terms on the right side reduce to zero. Thus: 












Recall, from our earlier discussion, that the derivative was of ambiguous sign under 
eviction rights.  Why does the imposition of the Pigouvian demolition tax eliminate the 
ambiguity?  In the absence of the tax, 
* dU
dD
can be decomposed into two effects, a direct 
effect (holding QV and  fixed), which is unambiguously negative, and an 
allocative effect due to the increase in D decreasingQ . By minimizing the deadweight 
loss from uncompensated evictions, the imposition of the optimal Pigouvian tax 
eliminates the latter effect via the Envelope Theorem. The ambiguity of the effect on 
welfare of a rise in building costs and in the amount of vacant land is also eliminated, so 
that 










     How might the real-world analog of the paper’s demolition tax be implemented in 
practice?  What we have modeled as demolition corresponds to any change in a unit’s 
status that requires that the sitting tenant vacate the unit, which includes rehabilitation, 
tenure conversion, sale (when this entails eviction of some or all sitting tenants), and 
occupancy by a friend or relative of the landlord.  Requiring that landlords file a non-
renewal of lease form with the authorities giving the cause of non-renewal would in  
principle give the authorities the information needed to apply the tax.  Evasion would no 
doubt be a problem.  Landlords would have an incentive to state that leases were not   23 
renewed because tenants behaved badly, or to persuade tenants to move by providing a 
financial inducement or by withholding services.  Such evasive tactics would have to be 
countered through landlord-tenant law; for example, the law could require that the burden 
of proof for eviction due to bad behavior be on the landlord. 
           In the regime of unqualified security of tenure, the optimal moving subsidy, S
*, 
induces the marginal tenant to decide to move this period, conferring an expected 
marginal benefit on the landlord. This benefit is the expected profit from the landlord 
becoming free to demolish or maintain the unit less the expected profit of forced 
maintenance were the tenant to have stayed in the unit. Hence, 
(15)                                 .   δδ Sg v V V M
* (, ) ( ) =− − 1
The tenant can be brought to face the social cost of staying through either a tax on 
staying or a subsidy for moving.  Since a subsidy for moving would be administratively 
simpler, that is the one we consider.  If a tenant moves, the landlord’s expected 
conversion profit is .  If the tenant stays, expected conversion 
profits are  .  Thus, the expected cost the tenant imposes on the 
landlord by staying, measured at the end of the period, is
( ( max , ii EV M n v d −− −
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receiving a moving subsidy of this amount, the tenant  faces the expected social cost of 
staying.  The tenant’s probability of moving is 
(16)                         =
**
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and the optimized stationary utility after substitutions is   24 
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 are the same, since the only 
difference is that m´=m – S
* replaces m. The comparative static derivatives for U are 
qualitatively unchanged from those under eviction rights.  Thus, for example, 
*
 (18)                                        
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The moving subsidy is set at a level which neutralizes the allocative effect, and what 
remains is the direct effect. Since the moving subsidy is set at a level that minimizes the 
deadweight loss associated with sitting tenants preventing profitable redevelopment, the 
effect of a marginal change in an exogenous parameter on this deadweight loss is zero. 
  We can summarize our analysis in terms of a diagram in () space.  
Consider Figure 3.  It portrays four relevant regions of the (, space.
11 12 , nd uu −−
11 12 ) nd uu −− 7 In 
region I   Ù , so that demolition is more 
profitable than maintenance, and u  Ùuu , so that the tenant would like to 
stay.  Region I is where the conflict between landlord and tenant occurs.  In region II, the 
landlord wishes to maintain and the tenant wishes to stay, so there is no conflict.  In 
region III, the landlord wishes to maintain and the tenant wishes to move, so again there 
is no conflict.  Finally, in region IV, the landlord wishes to demolish and the tenant 
wishes to move, so again there is no conflict. 
11 ndVMv D −>−− + 1 vDd VMn −−>− −
12 u − 12m α >−
1
                                                 
7 The corresponding diagram for type 2 housing is symmetric.   25 
  Now imagine the corresponding diagram for the first-best, full information 
optimum, which is of interest only as a point of reference.  There are three possible 
outcomes: tenant stays/landlord maintains, tenant moves/landlord maintains, tenant 
moves/landlord demolishes.  The optimum may be characterized by a partitioning of 
- space into regions for each of these three outcomes, ( 11 12 , nd uu −− )
                                                
8 and the 
deadweight loss associated with a particular property rights regime defined with 
reference to this. 
  Now return to Figure 3.  Under unqualified eviction rights, tenant stays/landlord 
maintains occurs in region II, tenant moves/landlord maintains occurs in region III, and 
tenant moves/landlord demolishes occurs in region I and IV. This partitioning is different 
from that in the first-best optimum and hence entails a deadweight loss relative to the 
first-best optimum.  Now impose a demolition tax.  This alters the position of the  = 
constant locus separating regions I and IV from regions II and III
11 nd −
9, and also the 
deadweight loss relative to the first-best optimum.  The optimal demolition tax minimizes 
the deadweight loss for this property rights regime.  The optimal demolition tax is set so 
that the landlord faces the expected social cost of his actions, and both tenants and 
landowners face the social cost of their actions since under eviction rights their choices 
generate no external costs. 
  Now consider complete security of tenure.  Tenant stays/landlord maintains 
occurs in regions I and II, tenant moves/landlord maintains occurs in region III, and 
tenant moves/landlord demolishes occurs in region IV.  This allocation involves a 
 
8 Observe that such a partitioning implies a particular probability of demolition which, via the stationary 
state condition, implies a particular probability of construction.   26 
different deadweight loss.  Now impose a moving subsidy.  This alters the position of not 
only the u = constant locus separating regions I and II from regions III and IV, but 
also the nd  locus (through the induced changes in the stationary-state 
values of V and v) and hence the deadweight loss.  The optimal moving subsidy 
minimizes the deadweight loss for this property rights regime.  The optimal moving 
subsidy is set so that the tenant faces the expected social cost of her actions, and both 
landlords and landowners face the social cost of their actions since under security of 




VMv D −− +
  Of central interest — to which we turn in the next section — is quantitative 
comparison of the deadweight losses under the two property rights regimes and with and  
without the relevant Pigouvian tax/subsidy. 
7. Numerical examples 
Table 2 shows a set of best-guess parameters we have selected for numerical analysis of 
the two regimes. The first numerical exercise is to compare how a switch in regime 
affects the values of the endogenous variables under the parameter values of Table 2. 
These results are shown in Table 3 (compare columns 1 and 3).  
       In the regime of full eviction rights, we see that 2 % of the vacant land is built on 
each period, while 1 % of the housing stock is demolished. This implies a construction 
rate of 1% of the existing stock per year, which is realistic for the United States. A little 
under 7 % of tenants move voluntarily each period, which is the average moving rate in 
the U.S. housing market. The rent-to-value ratio for housing is about 1/9, also reasonable. 
Switching to full security of tenure, housing value falls by about 8.2% while the land 
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value falls by only 1.8%. Rent falls by 4.3%. These effects reflect that holding housing 
units becomes less attractive when landlords cannot evict tenants. The change in relative 
asset prices makes holding housing less attractive relative to holding land, which 
increases the proportion of housing units landlords would like to demolish (the “desired 
demolition rate”) from about 1% to 4.8%. However, the number of housing units actually 
demolished decreases, since only voluntarily vacated units are eligible for demolition 
when there is security of tenure. The result is that   ≈ 1006 units are demolished 
when landlords have full eviction rights but only    ≈ 324 units are demolished 
when tenants have security of tenure. So the drop in the asset price of housing relative to 
the asset price of land, which occurs with the switch from eviction rights to security of 
tenure, induces a nearly fivefold increase in the desired demolition rate but a 68 % drop 
in the number of actual demolitions. The rate of new construction falls accordingly. 
D NQ
( NP m) D Q
      In the numerical example, eviction protection hurts tenants. The reason is that 
although rent falls when tenants are protected from eviction, asset prices also fall and 
tenants become worse off because their dividends from asset ownership are reduced.
10           
      The effects of the optimal tax or subsidy in the respective regime are shown in Table 
3 (compare columns 2 and 1, and 4 and 3). The demolition tax decreases the demolition  
rate (and consequently also the construction rate) while leaving unchanged the 
                                                 
10 That a policy A leads to a higher level of stationary-state utility than policy B does not ordinarily imply 
that policy A is superior to policy B, since the utility along much of the transient path to the stationary-state 
equilibrium under policy A might be considerably lower than that along the transient path to stationary 
state equilibrium under policy B. Here however, since the housing stock is the same under the two regimes, 
and along the transient paths as well as in stationary-state  equilibrium, it would appear that in the example 
an unanticipated switch from full security of tenure to full eviction rights would unambiguously increase 
expected utility.   28 
probability of moving voluntarily,  . The moving subsidy increases the probability 
of moving by 24% (from 0.067 to 0.083) and, indirectly, decreases the desired demolition 
rate by 11.5% because it causes the price of housing to rise by 0.65%. Because, under 
eviction protection, landlords can demolish only voluntarily vacated units, the net effect 
on the number of demolitions is unclear in general, but demolitions are decreased in the 
reported simulations.  
( ) Pm
       Next, Figures 2a and 2b show how optimal Pigouvian intervention becomes more 
beneficial according to the level of moving cost or demolition cost. In Figure 4a, as the 
demolition cost is increased from zero toward infinity the improvement in utility caused 
by the moving subsidy decreases asymptotically toward zero. Correspondingly, in Figure 
4b, as the cost of moving is increased from zero to $ 10,000, the improvement in utility 
from the demolition tax increases.  
8. Concluding Remarks 
    This paper presented a highly simplified dynamic model of the rental market for 
durable housing with tenant mobility costs. To our knowledge, the model is the first to 
look at mobility in the housing market from a market equilibrium perspective. 
      North American rental housing markets of the fifties and sixties approximated full 
eviction rights, and most European markets of the fifties, sixties and seventies, full 
security of tenure. The most significant − though hardly surprising − result was that the 
property rights regime has a substantial impact on tenant mobility, which partially 
explains why, over that period, rental housing mobility rates were so much higher in 
North America than in Europe. A numerical example with rough, best-guess parameters 
suggested that full eviction rights lead to a more efficient outcome than full security of   29 
tenure (which is not to say that there may not be intermediate regimes which are more 
efficient than either) but the dollar-equivalent welfare difference between the two 
regimes was not found to be large under the parameters used. Under full eviction rights, 
the landlord imposes an uninternalized negative externality on a tenant who wishes to 
stay. Analogously, under full security of tenure, a sitting tenant imposes an 
uninternalized externality on a landlord who wishes to modify his unit. These 
externalities can be partially internalized through Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, but the 
numerical examples suggest that the welfare gains are small. 
      Several directions for future research suggest themselves. The first is to enrich the 
model in order to provide a more descriptively realistic conceptual basis for empirical 
work on housing mobility and for housing policy simulation. Some enrichments are the 
treatment of housing differentiation by quality and type and tenant differentiation by 
income-demographic group, as presented in Anas and Arnott (1997). Others such as life-
cycle decision making by households, serial correlation in the idiosyncratic component of 
costs and utilities, and recognition that modification of a building often requires the 
simultaneous eviction of all its tenants, are more challenging. 
      A second direction is to give further attention to the form of the landlord-tenant law 
(and contract) vis-à-vis household mobility. In the paper, we took the form of the 
contract, and in particular whether there are full eviction rights or full security of tenure 
as exogenous, and examined the implications for market equilibrium of the two contract 
types. We defended the assumption on the grounds that many contract forms may be  
stable. This argument needs to be further developed and scrutinized. As well, work needs 
to be done which endogenizes the form of contract. While some work has been done on   30 
rental housing contract theory (that of Hubert (1989) is particularly noteworthy), much 
remains to be done. Exploring the analogy between housing and labor markets may prove 
powerful, as it has in other contexts (Hubert (1989), Igarashi (1990)). For example, job 
security is analogous to security of tenure, and labor economic models have been 
developed which treat idiosyncratic job attachment (e.g. Hashimoto (1981)). In this 
context, treating tenant heterogeneity is important, as is treating the cost to the landlord 
of obtaining a new tenant, which the current tenant neglects when deciding whether to 
move. 
       A third, related direction is to focus on public policy with respect to rental housing 
regulation. A common view is that asymmetric information and negotiation/bargaining 
costs lead to endemic and systematic contractual failure. What regulations could help 
achieve more efficient landlord-tenant contracting? What taxes and subsidies should be 
introduced to induce superior contracting or to offset inefficiencies induced by 
contracting? And might there even be a role for government as dominant landlord? For 
example, should a public agency act as a central matchmaker (Anas (1997)), as is 
observed in Scandinavia and some other European countries, matching tenants who are 
unlikely to move in the future with landlords who are unlikely to make conversions?  
Also, should governments subsidize homeownership as is done in many countries? If the 
occupant of a dwelling owns the unit, he has security of tenure and also the right to 
convert; the bilateral landlord-tenant externality is internalized. 
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Appendix 1 (Not intended for publication but will appear in downloadable version of the 
paper). 
 
A.  Properties of the Gumbel distribution and the logit model 
 
Definition: A random variable x is said to have the Gumbel distribution with mean zero 
and dispersion parameter ψ> 0, if the c.d.f. is F(x) = exp[−exp−ψ (x + γ)]. ψ =π ⁄ (σ√6), 
where σ is the standard deviation of x. γ = 0.577 is Euler’s constant. 
 
Proofs of properties a and b below, can be found in Johnson and Kotz (1970) and proof 
of property c can be found in Domencich and McFadden (1975).  
 
Property a: If x is Gumbel distributed with mean zero and dispersion parameter ψ, and if 
β > 0 and X  are any constants, then the random variable X + βx is also Gumbel 
distributed with mean X and dispersion parameter  ψ /β.    
 
Property b: Suppose that β  > 0 is any positive scalar and that X1, X2,…,Xn are any 
constants. If  x1, x2 …, xn are independently Gumbel distributed each with mean zero and 
common dispersion parameter, ψ , then max ( X1 + βx1, X2 + βx2 …, Xn + βxn) is Gumbel 
distributed with mean (β /ψ ) ln ∑j=1…n exp (ψ/β )Xj and dispersion parameter 
ψ /β.  
 
Property c: Suppose that property b holds. Then, Prob.[ Xi + βxi > Xj + βxj ; ∀ j≠ i ] =  
exp (ψ /β )Xi / ∑j=1…n exp (ψ/β )Xj. This is known as the multinomial logit (MNL) model. 
 
B. Derivation of  equations (1), (2), (3), (6), (7), (8) and (9). 
 
We encountered three separate instances of the MNL model. First, in each period, each 
tenant’s moving behavior is described by a binomial logit model: a tenant who is evicted 
decides which submarket to move to, and a tenant who moves voluntarily decides 
whether to stay in his current unit or move to the other submarket. Second, in each 
period, each landlord in the regime of full eviction rights and each landlord whose tenant 
has moved out voluntarily in the security of tenure regime, decides whether to demolish 
his unit or continue to maintain it at its current quality. This is also described by the 
binomial logit model. Third, in each period, each landowner decides whether to keep his 
land vacant for the next period, or whether to construct one of the two housing types. 
This is described as a trinomial logit model. Each of these are derived by applying the 
properties in part A of this Appendix. In each case, the constant β in part A, corresponds 
to the discount factor δ used by the agents in the model. 
 
Tenants: The Gumbel random variables x1, x2 are the idiosyncratic utilities u1, u2, and we 
define their dispersion parameter ψ  to be µ  which measures idiosyncratic tenant 
heterogeneity. Under conditions of symmetry, for a tenant who moves involuntarily out 
of his unit because he is evicted, X1, X2 are the systematic components of utility, and X1 =   34 
X2 = α  (Y−R−δm) + δ  U.  Hence, applying Property b yields equation (1) which is 
expected net utility of moving, and applying Property c gives a binomial submarket 
choice probability equal to ½. For a tenant who is currently located in submarket i and 
considers moving voluntarily (under the conditions of symmetry), the systematic 
components of utility are Xi = α (Y −R) + δU and Xj =  α (Y −R−δm) + δU, where j is the 
other submarket. Then, applying Property b yields the expected net utility of moving 
given by equation (3), and applying Property (c) yields equation (2) which is the 
probability that the tenant will choose not to move. 
 
Landlords: The Gumbel random variables x1, x2 for a landlord in submarket i are the 
idiosyncratic costs −di and −ni respectively (corresponding to demolition and 
maintenance). We define the dispersion parameter of these idiosyncratic costs to be Φi  
(corresponding to the ψ  in part A). The systematic parts of profits in submarket i are X1 
=−Vi+Ri +δ (v− D) and X2 = −Vi +Ri + δ (Vi − M). Then, Property c can be applied to 
derive the demolition probability given by equation (8). Applying Property b, the 
expected maximized profit is calculated and setting this equal to zero and solving for Vi , 
yields equation (7) which gives the asset price of a house in submarket i.  
 
Landowners: The Gumbel random variables x1,  x2,  x3 for a landowner are the 
idiosyncratic costs −n0 and −b1, −b2 respectively (which correspond to keeping the land 
vacant, building a type 1 house and building a type 2 house). We define the dispersion 
parameter of these idiosyncratic costs to be φ (which corresponds toψ  in part A).The 
systematic profits are X1 = −v + r + δ v, and X2 = −v +r + δ (V1 −B1) and X3 = −v +r + δ 
(V2 − B2). Then, property c can be applied to get the construction probability given by 
equation (9). From property b, the expected maximized profit is found, and setting this 
equal to zero and solving for v yields equation (6) giving the asset price of land.  
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Appendix 2:Comparative Statics (Not intended for publication but will appear in 
downloadable version of the paper). 
 
 
Rather than derive the comparative statics results separately for the two property rights 
regimes, we write out the set of equations (10a)-(10c) and (11a)-(11c) with θ as a 
parameter, recalling that under eviction rights θ = 0 while under security of tenure 
:     1( Pm θ =− )
Φ
(A2.1)                 (1 −θ )QD(V,ν)N − QΒ(V,ν)(L− N) = 0
(A2.2)                  V −θ δ (V − M) − (1−θ)g1(V,ν) − R = 0
(A2.3)       ,  ν−g0(V,ν) − r = 0
Totally differentiating the above equation system:     
I II III dV X XIII XVI XIX
IV V VI dv XI dM XIV dD XVII dB XX d
VII VIII IX dR XII XV XVIII XXI
         
          =++ +          
                   
     
()
1( )
XXII XXV XXVIII XXXI XXXIV XXXVII
L
XXIII d XXVI d XXIX dr XXXII d XXXV d XXXVIII d m
NP
XXIV XXVII XXX XXXIII XXXVI XXXIX
θ
φδ θ
        





Although the algebra looks intimidating, the special properties of the logit render it 
manageable.  These properties are: 










= φQB(1 − QB) 
 










=− φQB(1− Q B)     
   
∂g1(V,ν)
∂V
= δ(1 − QD) 
∂g0(V,ν)
∂V
= δQB   36 
   
∂g1(V,ν)
∂ν
= δQD  
∂g0(V,ν)
∂ν
= δ(1− QB) 
()











The derivatives with respect to V, v, and R are: 
 







      =   −(1 −θ)ΦQD(1 − QD)N −φQB(1 − QB)(L − N)





   
 
  (using  (A2.1)) 
      =     [] (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 0, DD B NQ Q Q θφ −− Φ− + − <




                      
=1   −θδ − (1 −θ)δ(1 − QD) = 1− δ 1− QD(1−θ) () > 0
V =− (1 −θ)
∂g1
∂ν
=− (1 −θ)δQD < 0, VI ,  =− 1< 0 VII =−
∂g0
∂V












=− (II)(VII) + (I)VIII = .  (I)(VII + VIII) = (I)(1−δ) < 0
The derivatives with respect to the exogenous parameters are: 




,                                  
 
XIII = (1−θ )ΦQD(1 −QD)N > 0
XVI =− φQB(1− QB)(L− N) < 0 ,
) )( 1 ( ) > + − − − − D v M V Q Q D D θ
, XIV =−(1 −θ )δQD < 0






) ( ) (
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1 ) ( ) (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( D v M V
D v M V
e e
e D v e M V g
XX − Φ − Φ































φ(V ,  , XXIX =0, 








> 0,  ,  ,    XXXIV = QDN > 0 XXXV = δ(V −Μ )− g1 < 0 XXXVI = 0
(1 ( )) ( ) ( , ) 0 D XXXVII P m P m Q v V N α =− <
(1 ( )) ( ) ( ) XXXVIII P m P m V M αδ =− − − +
, 
,    [] 1( , ) 0 g V v > 0. XXXIX =
         The signs of the comparative static derivatives are shown in Table 1 and most are 




whose ambiguity on the basis of the sign pattern is resolved through algebraic 
calculations.  
          The effects of changes in exogenous variables on welfare may be established by 
applying the above results to (10d) (the equation for social welfare under eviction rights) 




 under eviction rights:  .
dU U U dV U dv




The expression for 
U in full is: 
1




UY V v g V v Q V v k m Q V v k
N
αδ δ δ δ
δ













=− − − Φ − −
∂− −
k ,  









=− + Φ − −
∂− −
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Φ(1−QD)+φ(1 −QB) ( (1 −δ) )





Φ(1 −QD)+φ(1−QB) ( (1−δ) )
  .       




ˆ (1 ) (1 )(1 )( )
.
11 ( 1 ) ( 1 )
DD D B
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 −Φ − −
=− −   −− Φ − + − 
k −
 
which is unambiguously negative.  The first term on the right side captures the direct 
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Landlords 
                                                                       Idiosyncratic costs  
                                                                       are revealed, and 
Value assets                                                    decisions to evict/       Demolitions       Capital  
Receive rent                                                    demolish are made        are made        gains accrue  
                                            
↓                                                                        ↓                                  ↓                            ↓ 
______________________________________________________________________________    
←               Beginning of period            → ←              End of period                                    →  
 
 
↑                           ↑                                                          ↑                                                  ↑ 
 
Receive income     Idiosyncratic tastes for next               Evicted tenants                      Tenants 
Pay rent                period are revealed and voluntary       must move and                   get dividends                                   
                              moving decisions are made                voluntary movers  
                                                                                          also move 
Tenants                                                                                                       
 
FIGURE 1:  Timeline, showing sequencing of decisions and events within one time 
period. (Note: Outcomes which occur at the end of the period are discounted to the 
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  0  11 nd −
 
u1= u2– αm (u1– u2 = −αm) 
 
FIGURE 3: Diagrammatic summary 
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FIGURE 4a: Utility Gain From Optimal Moving 
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FIGURE 4b:Utility Gain From Optimal Demolition 
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M D B Φ 
L
N   φ  r  δ  m or µ  θ
** 
V  + – ? ? – ?  +  +  −(0)*  – 
v  + – ? ? – ?  +  +  −(0)*  – 
R  + ? ? ? –  ? +  (=1)
  ? ? ? 
  U 
 




  n.a –  ? 
TABLE 1: Comparative Statics  
*Denotes results in (  apply only with eviction rights.  ) •
**With eviction rights,
  =0, while under security of tenure  =1− .Thus, an increase 
in   may be interpreted as improved security of tenure. 





                        
N = 100,000                           L = 150,000
* 
 
Y = $ 45,000 per year             m = $ 2,500 per move  
 




= Φ  ⇒   = $ 8,971;    D σ
5000
1
= φ ⇒  B σ  = $ 6,408 
 
B = $ 50,000             D = $ 10,000           M = $ 5,000     r = $ 5,000  
                                                                                                                 













= standard deviation of idiosyncratic 






= standard deviation of idiosyncratic utilities of tenants.) 
*  N/L is the proportion of land that is occupied.
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             1  
Eviction Rights 
 
          2   
Eviction Rights 
with Optimal 
Demolition Tax  
           3  
Tenure Security 
          4 
Tenure Security 
 With Optimal 
Moving Subsidy 
      v    $ 102,703   $ 102,307     $ 100,861        $ 100,944 
  V     $ 120,649   $ 119,136     $ 110,754     $ 111,479 
  R     $   10,734   $   10,666     $   10,272     $   10,307 
  U        858,189      858,216        856,987        857,023 
   (v,V)  D Q          0.01006        0.0086          0.0484          0.0428 
   ( B Q  v,V)           0.02012        0.0172          0.00645          0.00707 
  N    D Q
  NP(m)   D Q
        1,006 
         
         860 
          
 
           324 
 
            287 
  1−P(m)           0.933        0.933          0.933          0.917 
   k(m)           62.1         62.1          62.1           77.6 
     ) ( ˆ m k     −1,751.2     −1,751.2      −1,751.2       −1,543.3 
  Ω(v,V)     $    8,600      $     8,530       $     8,059       $     8,080 
     0(,) gV v    $  97,703     $   97,307       $   95,861       $   95,944 
     ) , ( 1 V v g    $109,915    $ 108,470       $ 100,702       $ 101,363 
     () VM δ −    $109,867    $ 108,429       $ 100,466       $ 101,155 
   T
*      $     1,909     
   S
*             $        219 
 
TABLE  3: Comparison of the two regimes with and without optimal taxation. 
 
 





   